Sharing the burden of collective security in the European union by Dorussen, H et al.
Sharing the Burden of Collective
Security in the European Union
Han Dorussen, Emil J+ Kirchner,
and James Sperling
Abstract This article compares European Union ~EU! burden-sharing in secu-
rity governance distinguishing between assurance, prevention, protection, and com-
pellence policies+ We employ joint-product models and examine the variation in the
level of publicness, the asymmetry of the distribution of costs and benefits, and aggre-
gation technologies in each policy domain+ Joint-product models predict equal burden-
sharing for protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and
summation aggregation technologies with symmetric costs+ Prevention is also char-
acterized by the technology of summation, but asymmetry of costs implies uneven
burden-sharing+ Uneven burden-sharing is predicted for compellence because it has
the largest asymmetry of costs and a best-shot aggregation technology+ Evaluating
burden-sharing relative to a country’s ability to contribute, Kendall tau-tests exam-
ine the rank-correlation between security burden and the capacity of EU member
states+ These tests show that the smaller EU members disproportionately shoulder
the costs of assurance and protection; wealthier EU members carry a somewhat dis-
proportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and larger EU members in the
provision of compellence+ When analyzing contributions relative to expected ben-
efits, asymmetric marginal costs can largely explain uneven burden-sharing+ The main
conclusion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the EU
is shared quite evenly+
The creation and maintenance of peace and security in Europe has been a persis-
tent and fundamental ambition of the European project+ The European Union ~EU!
has only recently acquired a tangible security role+ The precise limitations and
opportunities for the EU to emerge as a security actor after 1989 remain subject to
extensive debate+1 This research note makes two contributions to the debate+ First,
the multifaceted nature of security reveals considerable variation in the produc-
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tion of security goods; accordingly, the joint-product analysis2 provides an appro-
priate framework to study EU security governance as a collective-action problem+
Second, we find the smaller EU member states are not free-riding in the provision
of collective security policies, contrary to one of the central hypotheses in the
public-choice literature,3 and demonstrate that in fact EU member states equitably
share the costs attending the various dimensions of security governance+
EU prerogatives have always relied on the delegation of member-state author-
ity, but the delegation of authority in security matters is generally incomplete,
uneven in application, and in many instances nonbinding+ Member-state contribu-
tions to EU security governance consequently vary, limit EU effectiveness as a
security actor, and beg an important question: do the member states share equita-
bly the burden of security governance? Joint-product models hold that burden-
sharing depends on the method whereby differentiated security tasks are produced
~that is, their aggregation technology or how individual contributions combine to
provide security! as well as variation in costs and benefits+
In their application of public-goods models, Olson and Zeckhauser find evi-
dence supporting the exploitation hypothesis that alliances, such as the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization ~NATO!, are likely to provide a suboptimal level of defense
with burdens mainly imposed on large allies with disproportionate benefits and
relatively low marginal costs+4 Koenig-Archibugi and Webber and colleagues claim
that the barriers to the effectiveness of EU security governance reflect variations
in member-state interests and identity as well as complications engendered by
enlargement, respectively+5 Their findings would be unexpected if the Common
Foreign Security Policy ~CFSP! or European Security and Defense Policy ~ESDP!
solely entailed collective-action problems, because the exploitation hypothesis
would predict that the large states, once committed to CFSP or ESDP, would sup-
port strengthening institutional linkages to minimize small-state opportunities for
free-riding+ A more general conceptualization of the production of security gover-
nance therefore seems appropriate+
Security governance involves outputs with varying degrees of publicness and
distinctive production technologies+ The theory of impure public goods,6 or joint-
product models, highlights the importance of private defense benefits+ Dispropor-
tional burden-sharing has been related to specific security tasks; for example, NATO
2+ Sandler 1977 provides the original joint-product analysis; see also Sandler 1992; and Hirshleifer
1983+
3+ Olson and Zeckhauser 1966+
4+ Following Olson 1965 and Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, the debate on burden-sharing or “fair-
share” has mainly focused on NATO comparing the EU members with the United States+ Focusing on
security burden-sharing within the EU, Chalmers ~2000, 80–114! argues for a small-state bias in the
EU, but otherwise largely discounts the continued relevance of “public goods” theories to explain
burden-sharing+
5+ See Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 159; and Webber et al+ 2004, 17+
6+ See Buchanan 1965; Sandler 1977 and 1992; Sandler and Hartley 2001; and Sandler and Tschirhart
1980+
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security tasks now vary from strategic deterrence to large-scale military interven-
tion, and peacekeeping with a UN mandate+7 EU prerogatives and policy instru-
ments also vary across security governance policies—the allocation of security
tasks between the three pillars8 that formally defines the relative authority of EU
institutions+ Supranational principles govern those security tasks delegated to Pil-
lar I, where the Commission possesses a central policy-setting role and the Coun-
cil takes decisions by qualified majority+ Intergovernmentalism and unanimity voting
in the Council, qualified by the principle of constructive abstention, apply to Pil-
lar II; this pillar encompasses human rights, democratization, and traditional secu-
rity tasks+ Police and judicial cooperation are reserved for Pillar III, justice and
home affairs ~JHA!+ Those policies allocated to Pillar III remain largely subject to
member-state sovereign prerogatives; the EU can only act on the basis of unanim-
ity, and the decisions are legally nonbinding+
Previously, Kirchner and Sperling9 have argued that security governance, which
requires the EU ~and its member states! to perform two functions—institution-
building and conflict resolution—and employ two sets of instruments—the persua-
sive ~economic, political, and diplomatic! and the coercive ~military intervention
and internal policing!—generates four categories of governance policies: assur-
ance, prevention, protection, and compellence ~see Table 1!+ Assurance, preven-
tion, and compellence concern the EU’s external environment+ Conflict prevention
captures efforts to build or sustain institutions mitigating anarchy and contribut-
ing to order+Assurance targets postconflict reconstruction and attending confidence-
building measures+ Compellence encompasses military interventions, primarily
peace-enforcement and peace-keeping+ Protection addresses the requirements of
internal security+ The four tasks are often pursued concurrently and often combine
economic and military instruments+ However, an elective affinity exits between
policy instruments and specific governance challenges+ Prevention is largely con-
ducted within the legal framework of Pillar I, assurance policies involve both Pil-
lars I and II, compellence is positioned in Pillar II, while protection is primarily
situated in Pillar III+
In the next sections, we elaborate on the specific production technologies of EU
governance tasks and discuss variations in their levels of publicness+ In the sub-
sequent empirical section, we explore how EU member states have dealt with the
collective-action problems attending security governance+ Partially contradicting
expectations based on public-goods models, the burdens of collective security gov-
ernance are shared more or less equitably, although the larger, wealthier EU mem-
bers overcontribute to compellence and prevention activities, while the smaller
7+ See Khanna and Sandler 1996 and 1997; Sandler and Forbes 1980; Sandler and Murdoch 2000;
Arce and Sandler 2002; Shizumu and Sandler 2002; and Lindstrom 2005+
8+ The Lisbon Treaty dismantles the pillar system+ If the treaty is ratified in 2009, it would not
change the substance of the argument: Pillar I and Pillars II and III would be governed by the Com-
munity and the intergovernmental methods, respectively+
9+ Kirchner and Sperling 2007+
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members overcontribute to the provision of assurance and protection+ Asymmetri-
cal marginal costs and benefits largely explain this uneven pattern of burden-sharing+
EU Security Governance: Assurance, Prevention,
Compellence, and Protection
The intensity of the collective-action problem vexing each category of security
governance depends on levels of publicness ~that is, excludability and rivalry!,
asymmetry of ~marginal! costs and benefits, and the governing aggregation tech-
nology; namely, summation, best-shot, and weakest-link functions+ In case of a
summation technology, all individual contributions add equally to the supply of
the public good+ For best-shot technologies, the largest individualized contribu-
tion matters most, and the smallest contributions are decisive in case of weakest-
link technologies+10 The general expectation is that burdens will be shared less
evenly if on balance the goods are less “public” and asymmetries more relevant in
a particular category of security governance+11
Assurance
With the end of the Cold War, the EU had to deal with the postconflict conse-
quences of political instability at its borders+ Initially, assurance policies sought to
address the immediate dislocations attending the political transition in Central and
Eastern Europe and to alleviate postconflict political instability in the Balkans and
the Mediterranean basin, including the provision of humanitarian assistance+ Since
the 2000 Nice summit, which finalized the eastern enlargement, assurance policies
10+ Sandler 1992 provides a comprehensive introduction into various aggregation technologies+
11+ Sandler 1977, 444– 48, distinguishes between protective and deterrent defense goods+ Arce
and Sandler ~2002, 28! also relate classes of public goods to optimality and proposed institutional
arrangements+
TABLE 1. Typology of security governance policies
Instruments
Functions Persuasive Coercive
Institution-building Prevention Protection
Conflict resolution Assurance Compellence
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have mainly engaged fragile postconflict regimes along the EU perimeter toward
fostering regional political stability+ Milieu stability is a public good: EU mem-
bers ~or any other regional state! neither compete in its consumption nor can be
excluded from doing so+ The EU member states are equally interested in assur-
ance+ Open internal borders diffuse the negative consequences of political insta-
bility throughout the EU, even though states with external borders on the EU’s
southern and eastern borders may fear regional instability more+ The distribution
of costs and benefits is relatively symmetric and summation best describes the
aggregation technology, since assurance mainly relies on the combined efforts of
the EU+ Consequently, we expect equitable burden-sharing in this policy domain+
Prevention
Prevention seeks political stability via the expansion of governing capacity, facil-
itating economic ~re!development, and the containment of political strife between
opposing societal groups+12 Prevention represents long-term or “second-stage” secu-
rity goals and targets failing states globally+ Global political stability is a pure
public good: states can neither be excluded from its benefits nor are they rivals in
its consumption+ Prevention also provides significant private benefits: it allows
national governments to demonstrate global importance and enhances their lever-
age over target countries+ The private benefits are diluted when prevention is per-
ceived principally as a collective effort or executed under the EU aegis+ Threats
posed by failed states affect all member states evenly: refugees arrive in Europe at
multiple points of entry13 and negative economic externalities diffuse quickly across
Europe+ EU members differ, however, in their ability to intervene+ Colonial ties
are relevant; for example, the United Kingdom ~UK! can use the Commonwealth,
and France can use the less-institutionalized “France and Africa” summits to influ-
ence destabilizing developments+ The major members, especially the formal colo-
nial powers, are most important for diplomatic engagement+ Prevention however
relies mainly on funds available for long-term foreign aid where all contributions
are source neutral+ The production of prevention thus combines best-shot and sum-
mation technologies, the latter more tellingly+
Prevention presents a collective-action problem for the EU+ Individual coun-
tries are unlikely to feel sufficiently threatened by the risks of state failure in dis-
tant places to fund these policies fully on their own+ At the same time, the private
benefits attending these policies and the differentials in ~marginal! costs vary across
member states+ Since some members have an incentive to provide prevention pol-
icies outside the EU, we expect, on balance, free-riding to be a more serious prob-
lem as compared to assurance+
12+ Kirchner and Sperling 2007, 28–29+
13+ Thielemann and Dewan 2006 demonstrate that smaller EU countries carry a disproportionate
burden in providing refugee protection+
Collective Security in the European Union 793
Compellence
Compellence relies on the use of force or coercion+ The Peterberg tasks, which
define the EU compellence portfolio, reflect the continuing relevance of coercion
to alleviate security threats+ The principle of solidarity underpins any collective
EU military response+ Since a threat against any EU member risks escalation
and Europe’s political destabilization, the ability to address it jointly has
public-goods aspects+ Yet, the line between threats against a core national
interest as opposed to a core EU interest is ambiguous and contestable+ Com-
pellence thus allows for exclusion+ Further, whenever member states differ in
their risk assessment, the distribution of benefits will be asymmetric+ Resource
constraints further complicate joint action: the military participation of vari-
ous EU members in Iraq and Afghanistan has not only stretched national mili-
tary resources, but also hampers effective EU action elsewhere ~for example, in
Darfur!+
Even more importantly, EU members vary greatly in their ability to contribute
to compellence+ NATO members are better prepared to execute a joint response,
since their military forces are interoperable and have participated in large-scale
joint exercises+ In contrast, the traditionally neutral EU members are oriented toward
territorial defense and consequently ill-equipped to participate in multilateral mil-
itary operations+ France and the UK are the only members with an independent
capability to project military force; their involvement is a necessary condition for
EU action and determines operational effectiveness+ Comparing the categories of
security governance, compellence is the closest example of a best-shot production
technology+ Hirshleifer argues that the best-shot production technology enhances
the risk of exploitation+14 Although the EU has a clearly stated interest in empha-
sizing common security interests, we expect burden-sharing to be quite uneven
and the EU to rely on a fixed intergovernmental coalition of its largest members to
render coercion effective+
Protection
The Amsterdam Treaty established the goal of a European area of freedom, secu-
rity, and justice as the core objective of EU protection policies+ Internal security
requires member states to harmonize their institutional and legal infrastructures
and covers a wide spectrum of issues, including narcotics trafficking, terrorism,
organized crime, epidemiological surveillance, the policing of external borders,
14+ Hirshleifer 1983, 380–83+ The precise relation between group size and free-riding depends on
the characteristics of the members being added ~Sandler 1992, 52!+ If EU enlargement had meant includ-
ing countries with a strong interest in compellence as well as matching capabilities, it would have
eased any free-riding problems+
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and infrastructure security+ It falls under the aegis of Pillar III, where progress on
EU cooperation has been slow+15
Harmonization of legal infrastructure, sharing of information, and policy coor-
dination avoids the negative externalities of lax or asymmetrical enforcement of
national law+ Protection is clearly an impure public good+ Exclusion is feasible:
countries may decide to stop sharing information or to ~temporarily! limit the free
access of people or goods from specific countries+ Protection also suffers from
force-thinning, since resources are often targeted toward particular areas, and stricter
rules and enforcement in a particular region may displace criminal activities across
borders+16 Finally, governments can derive private benefits by taking credit for
locally reduced crime and increased security+ The asymmetry of threat perception
depends on the type of crime under consideration+ Crime varies considerably across
Europe, but concerns about cross-border criminal activities are spread more evenly+
The latter are the main target of Pillar III policies+ Larger and richer countries
have lower marginal costs of contributing to collective protection policies ~for exam-
ple, resources for police and judiciary, collecting and sharing information, and align-
ing legal and institutional frameworks!+
The weakest-link aggregation technology applies to protection with respect to
its provision as a public good+ Member states with the most lenient penal codes
and the least willingness to share information limit the ability to achieve the
common goal of combating organized crime, terrorism, or pandemics, natural or
otherwise+ The removal of internal barriers allows the ~relative! failure of a
weakest-link provider to spread across Europe+ Organized crime and terrorist cells
seek out safe havens, but their operations affect citizens across Europe+ The private-
goods aspects, as well as weakest-link aggregation technology, actually decrease
the collective-action problems for protection policies+ EU members may contrib-
ute voluntarily and approximate the optimal joint supply of protection+ In so doing,
states attain the private gains from protection and avoid weakest-link externali-
ties+ Variation in the marginal costs would explain redistribution of resources from
richer to the poorer EU members, where the credible threat of exclusion should
discourage exploitation+
Summary
The central hypothesis from joint-product models is that burden-sharing in EU secu-
rity governance varies across security policies+ Equal burden-sharing is expected for
protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and summation
aggregation technologies conjoined to symmetric costs+ In contrast, large countries
are expected to shoulder the costs of prevention and compellence+ The technology
of summation also describes prevention, but asymmetry of costs is expected to lead
15+ Hix 1999, 307–30+
16+ Sandler and Hartley 2001, 876+
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to uneven burden-sharing+ Uneven burden-sharing is predicted for compellence
because of its best-shot aggregation technology, where a committed effort of the
major players is often decisive+ Moreover, issues lending themselves to coercion
often involve asymmetric threats and the marginal costs of a military operation are
spread unevenly as well+
Data and Research Design
To assess the central hypothesis that the larger EU states carry a disproportion-
ately greater burden for compellence and prevention governance policies, while
EU states share the burden for assurance and protection polices more equitably,
we need to make three preliminary determinations: ~1! the activities to include in
the calculation of burden-sharing; ~2! the allocation of those activities to the var-
ious dimension of security governance; and ~3! the appropriate benchmarks for
defining equitable burden-sharing+ Regarding the first point, we have chosen to
exclude activities falling under the Community budget since the gross national
income ~GNI! key largely determines national contributions, and burdens are by
definition shared equitably+
The defining aspect of assurance is the emphasis on persuasion to sustain order
and create democratic institutions in a postconflict environment+Assurance encom-
passes postconflict missions and efforts to improve domestic governance, includ-
ing border control, policing, and criminal justice+ Most missions have taken place
in the near abroad, but there have been some in Africa and one in Southeastern
Asia+ For the Balkans, these policies are linked with the Stability and Association
Process ~SAP!+ ESDP missions focusing on the civilian aspects of humanitarian
and crisis management tasks are categorized as assurance missions+ Compellence
focuses on coercive measures to resolve conflict+ Apart from economic and polit-
ical sanctions, ESDP military missions and NATO0U+S+-led missions comprise this
category of security governance+17
Missions have common costs and operational costs+ The allocation of common
costs is in accordance with the GNI-key unless the Council unanimously decides
otherwise, and members opting out of a particular mission generally do not share
in the common costs+ The Community budget allocated a total of Y212 million to
ESDP missions in the period 2003–May 2005+ Common costs cover the overhead
costs during the preparatory and active phases of an operation, including force
headquarters, specific transportation costs, medical costs, and local staff+ Partici-
pating states cover operational costs according to the principle of “costs lie where
they fall+” These costs include the budget for troops and civilian personnel, and
the deployment of equipment to areas of operation+ Operational costs tend to be
17+ See ^http:00privatewww+essex+ac+uk0;hdorus& for a listing EU operations and actions accord-
ing to the category of security policy+ Accessed 2 July 2009+
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greater than common costs+18 We rely on the deployment of military and civilian
personnel to ESDP operations as a proxy for the distribution of operational costs+
Country contributions are measured in approximate person-years, accounting for
some missions starting or ending midyear+
Prevention covers a wide range of humanitarian and development assistance pro-
grams as well as a number of EU partnerships with countries in particular geo-
graphical regions, which tend to fall under the Community budget+ The partnership
with African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations, as well as Overseas Countries and
Territories ~ACP-OCT!, is special because it is funded by the European Develop-
ment Fund ~EDF! and is kept separate from the Community budget+ The EDF
contributions are voluntary and the programs are negotiated multilaterally with
the recipients+
Policies of protection do not yield easily usable and comparable data+ There is
data on European cooperation on law enforcement ~Europol! and judicial matters
~Eurojust!+ Europol is largely funded by contributions from the member states
according to the GNI-key, while Eurojust is funded directly by the European Com-
mission+ To assess burden-sharing for protection policies, we use the Eurojust case
load+
It is obviously important to reflect on the baseline to assess the “fairness” of
contributions+ The principle that has developed in the EU common budget is an
equitable contribution relative to GNI+ It is reasonable to expect that ability to pay
also matters for burden-sharing outside the Community budget+ The Kendall tau-
test is an appropriate nonparametric statistical test to evaluate burden-sharing rel-
ative to the ability to contribute+ Kendall tests rely on a comparison of rankings
and assume ordinal-level data+ Since it does not require any assumption about nor-
mality of the error terms, it is less affected by the small number of observations+
The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the ranking on resources
available and the ranking of share of resources committed to collective security
policies+ The Kendall tau-statistic ranges from 1 to 1+ If tau . 0, states with
more resources contribute a larger share of their resources, and if tau , 0, they
contribute a smaller share+ A rejection of the null hypothesis therefore suggests a
positive ~negative! relation indicating exploitation of the strong ~weak! by the weak
~strong!+ Contributions to prevention policies are in monetary terms, making it
appropriate to measure share of resources relative to gross domestic product ~GDP!+
The Kendall tau-test compares the ranking of member contributions relative to
their economic size ~contributioni0gdpi ! with their purchasing power parity GDP-
ranking+ Instead of capacity, it is also appropriate to use wealth ~measured as GDP
per capita! as a baseline+19 Contributions to assurance and compellence mission
are in person-year and measured as share of population+ Contributions to protec-
tion policies are in terms of information provided in response to requests and infor-
18+ Lindstrom 2005, 36+
19+ See Shizumu and Sandler 2002, 665– 66+
Collective Security in the European Union 797
mation meetings attended+ Sandler and Hartley20 refer to the Kendall tau-test as a
test of within-ally burden-sharing and note that it only partly controls for asym-
metric costs and benefits+
An alternative conception of fairness derives from the distribution of benefits:
contributions should be relative to the enjoyment of the collectively produced good+
The among-ally burdens measure relates the share of a particular EU member to
total EU spending ~contributioni0contributionsEU ! to its share of derived
~expected! benefits from the common policy ~benefitsi0benefitsEU !+ Sandler and
Forbes measure the benefits from NATO defense as an index of an ally’s industrial
base, its population, and exposed borders+21 Following a similar approach, we mea-
sure assurance benefits based on industrial base ~GNI!, social protection, Eastern
and Mediterranean borders, and number of asylum-seekers+ In the case of preven-
tion policies, GDP measures expected benefits+22 Benefits from compellence are
based on industrial base ~the GNI-key!+ For protection policies, benefits are mea-
sured by all requests made to Eurojust, EU homicides, and EU violent deaths+
Regression analyses evaluate among-ally fairness where the dependent variable is
operationalized as:
Y  ln Contributionsi(
iEU
Contributions
 Benefitsi
(
iEU
Benefits1
The log-transformation corrects for the fact that, by construction, countries accru-
ing a small share of the benefits are more liable to overcontribute dramatically+
The expected country share of benefits is the central independent variable+ A pos-
itive coefficient indicates that countries with larger shares of benefits contribute
disproportionately more to the collective provision, while a negative coefficient
indicates that they contribute disproportionately less+23
We include controls for EU members with less than a million citizens ~Luxem-
burg, Cyprus, and Malta!, for the ten accession states—Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, and ~Greek!
Cyprus, and when appropriate for non-NATO members and bilateral foreign aid+
In the case of assurance policies, we compare missions along the European perim-
20+ Sandler and Hartley 2001, 883+
21+ Sandler and Forbes 1980+
22+ We use data two years prior to the start of a particular EDF round with the exception of the
final round, for which the latest data available are 2004+
23+ Sandler and Forbes 1980; and Sandler and Hartley 2001 report the results from Wilcoxon tests+
The Wilcoxon tests rely on a ranking of differences+ Similarity of two-distribution is assessed by any
difference in the sum of positive and negative rankings+ When comparing two variables that are both
measured as shares ~by construction with equal means!, the Wilcoxon test thus becomes extremely
conservative+
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eter with those further afield+ For compellence missions, the relevant comparison
is between EU-led and NATO0U+S+-led missions+
EU Security Governance and Burden-Sharing
Since the data for the four security issues are not fully comparable, we first assess
burden-sharing for each category separately+ The comparison across categories is
left for the discussion+
Prevention
The budgeting of prevention policies is partly under the remit of the Commission,
but a significant part of the EU overseas development aid is funded through the
EDF+ Over time, the EDF budget has expanded greatly, but the share of the ten
accession states was limited in the tenth ~and most recent! EDF round+
Table 2 compares the ranking of the EU member-state EDF budgets relative to
GDP, with their rankings in size ~total GDP! and wealth ~GDP per capita!+ The
GDP data are lagged for two years prior to the finalization of each EDF round to
account for period of negotiation prior to agreement+ The first row shows gener-
ally no significant relation between ranking in the EDF budget and country size
for each of the ten EDF rounds completed so far+ The only exception is the tenth
EDF round, but the positive rank-correlation is not significant for the EU15 ~Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK! and accession states
analyzed separately+ The positive rank-correlation thus mainly reflects the dispro-
portionately smaller contributions of the accession states+ Interestingly, we can
reject the null hypothesis of even burden-sharing relative to wealth ~GDP per cap-
ita! for the more recent EDF rounds+ There is a significant positive rank-correlation
between EDF contributions and wealth+ The tau statistics show that richer coun-
tries spend a larger proportion of their GDP on prevention, and the relationship
becomes significant after the “southward” enlargement of the EU+ The inclusion
of the relatively poor Mediterranean states made the EDF more dependent on the
richer north+ Subsequent enlargements have not affected the overall picture+
A comparison of the among-ally burden shares gives a somewhat different pic-
ture+ Table 3 gives the results of regressing EDF contribution relative to share of
expected benefits ~measured as country’s share of total EU GDP! on size and wealth,
and, where appropriate, using EDF round, accession states, bilateral foreign aid,
and the former colonial powers as further controls+ The first two models include
information from all ten EDF rounds, while the latter four models examine the
possible impact of the eastward enlargements in the final EDF+ The negative and
significant coefficient for size shows that the larger EU members contribute less
than would be expected based on derived benefits+ Countries that spend more on
Collective Security in the European Union 799
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bilateral foreign aid also tend to contribute disproportionately to the EDF bud-
gets,24 while the accession states fail to contribute proportionally+ Depending on
model specification, the former colonial powers contribute disproportionately+ Even
controlling for foreign aid, richer countries contribute disproportionately to the
EDF budget, while larger ~that is, more populous! countries generally contribute
less+
The results for prevention policies thus reveal more even burden-sharing than pre-
dicted by the joint-product model+ The ability to pay and lower marginal costs of
allocating funds to foreign aid are strongly related to contributions to EDF pro-
grams+ The Kendall tau results, however, suggest that total GDP ~as an indication
of ability to contribute! only has a limited impact+ The regression analyses even sug-
gest that larger countries fail to contribute relative to their share of expected benefits+
Compellence
There is clear variation in the involvement of EU members in military operations+
Most notably, Denmark does not contribute to EU-led operations, while it is active
24+ Domestic political institutions may well explain lower marginal costs of contributing to foreign
aid ~Noël and Thérien 1995!, but significantly, even controlling for bilateral official development assis-
tance ~ODA!, EU institutions appear ineffective in overcoming any such bias+
TABLE 3. Determinants of EDF-share relative to country size for wealth,
population, and aid shares
EDF/size (ln)
EDF 1–EDF 10 EDF 1–EDF 9 EDF 10
Constant 0+722 0+594 0+683 0+521 0+730 0+547
~0+031!** ~0+056!** ~0+041!** ~0+078!** ~0+038!** ~0+091!**
Size (share) 0+965 0+951 1+456
~0+226!** ~0+234!** ~0+426!**
Foreign aid (share) 0+650 0+527 0+619 0+509 1+680 0+823
~0+217!** ~0+152!** ~0+217!** ~0+156!** ~0+668!* ~0+574!
Wealth (share) 2+361 2+273 3+525
~1+005!* ~1+054!* ~1+519!*
Population (share) 0+782 0+781 0+673
~0+197!** ~0+207!** ~0+481!
Accession states 0+397 0+330 0+401 0+317
~0+037!** ~0+038!** ~0+044!** ~0+054!**
Colonial powers 0+052 0+068 0+066 0+081 0+063 0+020
~0+033! ~0+027!* ~0+037! ~0+030!** ~0+075! ~0+067!
N 115 115 90 90 25 25
R2 0+51 0+60 0+27 0+41 0+87 0+89
Notes: Table uses ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression+ Foreign aid: bilateral aid as share of EC0EU total ~OECD!+ Colonial powers:
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom+ EDF  European Development Fund+ Models include
dummy-variables for each EDF-round, not presented+ Robust standard errors in parentheses+ * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%+
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in NATO0U+S+-led operations+ The UK and the Baltic states are much more active
in NATO0U+S+-led operations, while France and Spain focus predominantly on
EU-led missions+ With the exception of Sweden, the EU-neutrals—Austria, Fin-
land, and Ireland—also contribute predominantly to EU missions+ The accession
states generally appear to contribute generously to compellence missions, partic-
ularly to NATO0U+S+-led missions+
Table 4 compares the ranking of troops committed to EU0NATO-led operations
~relative to population! with the country-size ranking+ Troop commitment appears
to increase with size, but the finding is not robust when analyzing the EU15 and
accession states separately+ Similarly, there is no robust relation between troop
commitment and wealth+ The positive correlation for all missions and NATO0U+S+
missions does not hold up when analyzing the EU15 and accession states sepa-
rately, and thus would seem to reflect mainly the higher willingness of the newer
NATO members to contribute to NATO missions+
The regression analyses ~Table 5! suggests that lower marginal costs best explain
disproportional contributions to coercive missions+ Contrary to first impressions,
the accession states no longer significantly overcontribute to compellence+ Simi-
TABLE 4. Burden-sharing of deployment for military
coercive missions (MCM) relative to population, wealth,
and size of the economy
EU member
states EU15
Accession
states
MCM/population and size
All missions 0+467 0+143 0+378
~0+001! ~0+488! ~0+152!
EU-led 0+297 0+029 0+378
~0+040!1 ~0+921! ~0+152!
NATO0U+S+-led 0+451 0+105 0+494
~0+002! ~0+621! ~0+059!1
MCM/population and wealth
All missions 0+360 0+029 0+111
~0+013! ~0+921! ~0+721!
EU-led 0+204 0+162 0+022
~0+161!2 ~0+429! ~1+00!
NATO0U+S+-led 0+304 0+029 0+267
~0+036! ~0+921! ~0+323!
N 25 15 10
Notes: Table uses Kendall rank-order tests+ Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficients dis-
played with significance levels in parentheses+
1No longer significant ~at +1! when excluding small states ~Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta!+
2Becomes significant ~, +1! when excluding small states+
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larly, there is no significant correlation between GNI and contribution share+ As to
be expected, NATO members are significantly more likely to carry a larger share
of the NATO0U+S+-led military missions, owing in part to the lower marginal oper-
ational costs of contributing troops attending the integrated military command and
in part to the higher marginal political costs of not contributing to a NATO mis-
sion+ To a large extent, the asymmetric costs of providing troops thus account for
uneven burden-sharing+
Assurance
In absolute terms, deployment of personnel to civilian crisis management remains
modest+ Table 6 compares the rankings of deployment ~by population! and size,
and Kendall’s tau uncovers a significant negative correlation+ Contrary to the exploi-
tation hypothesis, larger countries contribute relatively less to civil crisis manage-
ment+ The negative correlation holds for the original EU members as well as the
accession states, even when excluding the smallest EU members+ The negative
rank-correlation applies particularly to missions along the European perimeter, while
it only applies to the EU15 members for missions in Africa and Asia+ In contrast,
the rank-correlation between deployment and wealth is nearly always insignifi-
cant+ Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that rich and poor countries
contribute evenly to civil crisis management+ The only exception is that the richer
TABLE 5. Determinants of deployment to military coercion missions
(MCM) relative to gross national income (GNI)
MCM/GNI (ln)
MCM/GNI (ln)
EU missions
MCM/GNI (ln)
NATO/U.S. missions
Constant 0+915 0+896 0+913
~0+170!** ~0+244!** ~0+170!**
GNI (share) 1+552 1+444 1+543
~1+143! ~1+588! ~1+153!
Accession states 0+355 0+076 0+355
~0+205! ~0+321! ~0+204!
Non-NATO members2 0+679 0+364 0+692
~0+234!** ~0+291! ~0+231!**
N 25 241 25
R2 0+56 0+09 0+57
Notes: Table uses ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression+ Robust standard errors in parentheses+
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%+
1Excludes Denmark+
2Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden+
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EU members contribute more to civil crisis management in Africa and Asia, but
the finding is not robust when evaluating EU15 and accession states separately+
Table 7 presents the results of regressing deployment relative to benefits as a
function of each country’s share of benefits, controlling for the accession states+
Analysis of among-ally burdens shows that states deriving a larger share of the
benefits significantly undercontribute to civil crisis management missions+ The coef-
ficients for the index of benefits are negative and significant for all types of mis-
sions+ The last three models show that GNI-share and share of the EU frontier are
both significant: larger and more exposed countries are failing to contribute pro-
portionally+25 Accession states appear less willing to contribute to missions fur-
ther afield+ To summarize, even accounting for asymmetries in marginal costs and
benefits, the smaller EU members appear to contribute more than their “fair” share
to assurance missions+
25+ Due to their high colinearity with GNI-share and border-length, it is impossible to include the
other elements of the Index ~social protection and asylum-seekers! separately in the model+
TABLE 6. Burden-sharing of deployment for civil crisis management
(CCM) relative to population compared to wealth and size of the
economy
EU member states
All
EU15
All
Accession states
All
CCM/population and size
All missions 0+633 0+581 0+911
~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000!
Europe and Middle East 0+673 0+581 0+911
~0+000! ~0+003! ~0+000!
Africa and Asia 0+127 0+410 0+109
~0+397! ~0+038! ~0+760!
CCM/population and wealth
All missions 0+047 0+295 0+378
~0+761! ~0+138! ~0+152!
Europe and Middle East 0+007 0+257 0+378
~0+981! ~0+198! ~0+152!
Africa and Asia 0+496 0+276 0+054
~0+001! ~0+166! ~0+919!
N 25 15 10
Notes: Table uses Kendall rank-order tests+ Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficients displayed with
significance levels in parentheses+
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Protection
Information for protection policies is much less complete as we only rely on Euro-
just data+ The number of coordination meetings attended and the number of infor-
mation requests are used as an indicator of contributions+ Table 8 compares the
ranking of contributions to Eurojust ~relative to the size of a country’s police force!
with the ranking of total GDP+ The main finding is that smaller countries overcon-
tribute to Eurojust+ This finding is stronger for the period 2004–2006 and holds
for both the original EU members and the accession states+ The findings for con-
tributions to Eurojust relative to wealth are less clear+ The richer EU15 countries
appear to overcontribute+ However, for the EU as a whole and the accession states,
the null hypothesis for even burden-sharing cannot be rejected+
Table 9 examines among-ally burden-sharing+ The countries’ share in the num-
ber of coordination meetings and received information requests measures the
among-ally distribution of contributions+ Benefits reflect the amount of requests
made to Eurojust and a country’s serious crime+ The unexpected finding, based on
joint-product models, is that contributions to joint protection appear to be inversely
related to derived benefits, even controlling for accession states that are less likely
to overcontribute+
Conclusion
Burden-sharing is a relevant issue in EU security governance that is likely to grow
in importance as the EU seeks an autonomous ability to act effectively across the
TABLE 7. Determinants of deployment to civil crisis management (CCM) relative
to expected benefits
CCM/index (ln) CCM/index (ln)
All
Europe/
Middle East
Africa/
Asia All
Europe/
Middle East
Africa/
Asia
Constant 1+200 1+103 1+343 1+162 1+060 1+336
~0+155!** ~0+120!** ~0+237!** ~0+160!** ~0+122!** ~0+245!**
Index (share) 5+733 5+007 6+754
~1+561!** ~1+296!** ~2+410!*
GNI (share) 2+889 2+467 3+669
~0+914!** ~0+790!** ~1+483!*
Border (share) 2+040 1+677 2+767
~0+375!** ~0+327!** ~0+554!**
Accession states 0+039 0+219 1+129 0+025 0+240 1+143
~0+232! ~0+236! ~0+237!** ~0+252! ~0+256! ~0+255!**
N 25 25 25 25 25 25
R2 0+25 0+30 0+55 0+26 0+29 0+61
Notes: Table uses ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression+ GNI  gross national income+ Index of GNI-share, length of Eastern and
Mediterranean borders, number of asylum seekers, and social protection as share of EU total+ Robust standard errors in parentheses+
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%+
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spectrum of global and regional security governance challenges+ It is reasonable
to expect that a deepening and broadening of EU prerogatives in security gover-
nance will only occur if the member states perceive the costs and benefits of col-
lective security provision as fair+ We have argued that the risk of uneven burdens
or free-riding varies according to policy area+ Where there is a high risk of free-
riding, EU members face a choice+ They can either accept most of the burden to
TABLE 8. Burden-sharing of European justice provision relative to
police force
EU member states EU15 Accession states
European justice
provision/police and size
2001–2003 0+333
~0+093!
2004–2006 0+467 0+410 0+956
~0+001! ~0+038! ~0+000!
European justice
provision/police and wealth
2001–2003 0+429
~0+029!
2004–2006 0+207 0+410 0+422
~0+154! ~0+038! ~0+107!
N 25 15 10
Notes: Table uses Kendall rank-order tests+ Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficients displayed with
significance levels in parentheses+
TABLE 9. Determinants of contributions to European justice
provision relative to benefits index
Contributions/benefits (ln)
2001–2003
Contributions/benefits (ln)
2004–2006
Constant 1+009 1+110
~0+126!** ~0+144!**
Benefits (share)1 0+032 0+053
~0+010!** ~0+016!**
Accession states 0+289
~0+164!
Observations 15 25
R-squared 0+33 0+23
Notes: Table uses ordinary least squares ~OLS! regression+ Robust standard errors in parentheses+
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%+
1Index of requests made, homicides, and violent deaths+
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be shouldered by a few members who could then dictate the direction of policy
“on the ground”; for example, the decisive French contribution to European Union
Force ~EUFOR! in the Democratic Republic of Congo provided Paris with lever-
age over the mission’s implementation+ Alternatively, the larger states can institu-
tionalize security cooperation in such a way as to minimize small-member free-
riding ~for example, place the ESDP or JHA under the Community method!+
Generalizing insights from public-goods models, joint-product models empha-
size the importance of specifying issue-specific aggregation technology and asym-
metric costs and benefits+ Here, we have introduced a new categorization of security
governance, but notably careful empirical testing fails to yield evidence that con-
sistently supports the theoretical expectations derived from these models for EU
security governance+ For assurance and protection, we observe instead that smaller
countries carry a heavier load+Admittedly, in both areas, the absolute burden borne
for the common policies remains modest+ Possibly, the EU members “trade in pub-
lic goods”;26 the smaller EU members specialize in internal and external policing
tasks, assurance and protection, and leave military coercion, compellence, to the
larger EU members+ Nonetheless, we are still left with an unexpected finding,
namely that burdens are shared evenly in compellence and prevention+
Since we cannot aggregrate the indicators for the four policy areas into a single
index of effort, it is difficult to evaluate the net balance of the contributions of
large and small countries+ It is, however, possible to aggregate personnel commit-
ted to assurance and compellence missions+ The rank-order correlations between
personnel contribution ~relative to population! and capacity to pay ~measured as
size and wealth! show that we generally cannot reject the null hypothesis of even
burden-sharing+27 Any evidence suggesting that larger or richer countries contrib-
ute disproportionately dissipates when the EU15 and accession states are ana-
lyzed separately, a meaningful differentiation given the incomplete and ongoing
socialization of the latter as EU member states+ Nor is there a significant relation
between the rank-ordering of contributions to the various areas of security poli-
cies+ The Kendall tau-statistics show a significant positive correlation between con-
tributions to assurance and protection policy areas ~to which smaller countries
contribute more! on the one hand, and prevention and compellence policies ~to
which wealthier countries contribute more! on the other+
As our analysis of security governance demonstrated, it is important to care-
fully identify the factors that may uniquely determine burden-sharing in particular
policy areas+ It seems reasonable to expect that the same would apply to other
policies, such as immigration and asylum, weapons procurement, or epidemiolog-
26+ Boyer 1989+ Relatedly, Thielemann and Dewan 2006 propose a division of labor between the
proactive ~larger! and reactive ~smaller! EU members with respect to refugee protection+
27+ Aggregating contributions to assurance and compellence, the Kendall tau-b with size and wealth
equaled +453 ~p +002! and +360 ~p +013! respectively+ Excluding contributions to NATO missions,
the Kendall tau-b with size equals +147 ~p +315! and with wealth +347 ~p +016!+ However, none of
these rank-correlations remained significant when analyzing EU15 and accession states separately+
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ical surveillance+A further contribution of our research has been to focus on burden-
sharing within the EU rather than on the NATO or UN+28 Arguably, joint-product
models should apply generally, and it would be interesting to explore their rele-
vance for the provision of regional security more generally+ At the same time, we
are aware of the highly institutionalized and sui generis nature of the EU as an
international organization+ The issue of burden-sharing is rendered generally moot
for policies falling under Pillar I ~for example, prevention! that are financed from
Community budget+ Only EDF contributions remain subject to an unfettered national
prerogative+ Here we observe that richer countries and those that generally spend
more on foreign aid contribute disproportionately to the EDF+ Compellence con-
forms to the expectations of the joint-product models: lower marginal costs of
providing troops best explain uneven contributions—a factor clearly shown by the
unique importance of NATO membership to explain contributions to NATO0U+S+-
led military operations+
The absence of chronic free-riding in the four categories of EU security gover-
nance policy confounds the expectations of public-goods models+ The high degree
of national policy integration and institutionalization within the EU may explain
why free-riding does not pose a serious problem to the provision of collective
security goods, but it is less clear why we observe the smaller states making dis-
proportionately large contributions to the policies of assurance and protection+ This
perhaps unexpected small-state behavior even holds when allowing for any unequal
distribution of benefits; in other words, contrary to Chalmers, we cannot find any
“small-state bias,” at least regarding common EU security policies+29 The most
likely explanation is that assurance and protection so far only require minor, pos-
sibly even symbolic, contributions; for example, a total of 1,722 person years are
deployed to civil crisis management compared to 232,111 to military missions+
Arguably, the smaller EU member states’ willingness to make disproportionately
large, albeit in absolute terms small, contributions reflects a political calculation
that those contributions will supply the necessary credibility for shaping the future
development of common security policies+
The equitable burden-sharing in each category of security governance also dem-
onstrates that the different aggregation technologies that apply to the four security
areas—summation for assurance and prevention, best-shot for compellence ~and
somewhat less clearly prevention!, and weakest-link for protection—do not pose
insurmountable barriers to the optimal supply of public goods+ The high degree of
28+ With the exception of NATO-led military operations, we exclude national policies undertaken
outside the EU framework from our analysis+ Our primary concern is the contribution of EU member
states to the EU as a security actor+ NATO-led missions are included owing to the tangled and over-
lapping memberships in NATO and the EU+ Moreover, the Berlin plus agreements explicitly acknowl-
edge that NATO will provide force projection capabilities and serve as the forum for coordinated action
where the interests of EU member states and the other members of NATO overlap+ Thus, contributions
to NATO and contributions to EU missions cannot be meaningfully disentangled although they are
legally separable+We have chosen to focus on the de facto rather than de jure status of combat missions+
29+ Chalmers 2000+
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policy coordination and integration in all three pillars of the EU, and the norms
conditioning reflexive compliance with Commission rules, suggest that either lower
marginal costs ~as in the case of compellence! or higher political benefits ~as in
the case of assurance for the accession states! better explain the disproportional
contributions of EU member states to security governance+ Thus, the institutional
and normative frameworks governing EU member-state security policies blunt the
anticipated political pathologies ascribed to the different technologies of public-
goods production+
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